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We propose a new measure of allocative efficiency based on unrealized increases in aggregate productivity
growth. We show that the difference in the value of the marginal product of an input and its marginal
cost at any plant - the plant-input "gap" - is exactly equal to the change in aggregate output that would
occur if that plant changed that input's use by one unit. The mean absolute gap across plants for any
input can then be interpreted as an approximation to the gain to society that would occur if every plant
had a one-unit change in that input in the efficient direction, holding everything else constant. We
show how to estimate this average gap using plant-level data for 1982-1994 from Chilean manufacturing,
a sector largely viewed as being one of South America's least distorted. We find the gaps for blue and
white collar labor are quite large in absolute value and imply that a one-unit move in the correct direction
for blue collar would increase aggregate value added by almost 0.5%. We also ˝find that the gaps for
blue and white collar workers are increasing over time while the gaps for materials and electricity
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We propose a new measure of allocative eciency based on unrealized increases in aggre-
gate productivity growth. We show that the dierence in the value of the marginal product
of an input and its marginal cost at any plant - the plant-input \gap" - is exactly equal to
the change in aggregate output that would occur if that plant changed that input's use by
one unit. The mean absolute gap across plants for any input can then be interpreted as an
approximation to the gain to society that would occur if every plant had a one-unit change
in that input in the ecient direction, holding everything else constant. We show how to
estimate this average gap using plant-level data for 1982-1994 from Chilean manufacturing,
a sector largely viewed as being one of South America's least distorted. We nd the gaps
for blue and white collar labor are quite large in absolute value and imply that a one-unit
move in the correct direction for blue collar would increase aggregate value added by almost
0.5%. We also nd that the gaps for blue and white collar workers are increasing over time
while the gaps for materials and electricity are not. The timing of the two separate increases
in ring costs and the sharpest increases in the labor gaps is suggestive that the increases
in average within-rm labor gaps may be related to the increases in severance pay.
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There are many phenomena that move an economy away from the neoclassical
setup where an input's value of marginal product is equated with its marginal cost.
These include markups, hiring, ring and search costs, capital adjustment costs,
taxes and subsidies, holdup and other contracting problems, and non-optimal man-
agerial behavior. We develop a simple approach that uses production data to es-
timate the \gaps" between an input's marginal product and its cost and use them
to infer the value of lost output arising from allocative ineciency.
We characterize allocative eciency in terms of its impact on aggregate pro-
ductivity growth (APG), dened as the change in aggregate nal demand minus
the change in aggregate expenditures on labor and capital. Under this denition
of APG, Petrin and Levinsohn (2011) show that a unit increase in any input raises
APG by that input's concurrent value of marginal product-input cost gap. With
common input costs across rms, aggregate output increases holding aggregate
input use constant if inputs are reallocated from lower to higher marginal value
activities. As an indicator of allocative ineciency, we look at the potential gain
from additional adjustments in inputs that do not occur.
The gaps are the principal input into our calculation of lost output from al-
locative ineciency. We show how plant-level or industry-level production data
identies the net output change when a unit of labor (e.g.) is reallocated from one
establishment to another, or from being unemployed to being employed. We pro-
vide a framework for evaluating policy changes that aect these plant-level gaps,
like increases in hiring or ring costs.
Our approach can readily be carried out in standard programming packages.
Our estimates for the value of marginal products use estimates from production
functions, for which there are a wide variety of estimators.1 Production data
also typically contains measurements on input expenditures, and we use these to
approximate the marginal cost of each input.
Our approach to measuring allocative ineciency is closest in spirit to Hsieh
and Klenow (2009) and is also related to the wide collection of denitions of reallo-
cation from Basu and Fernald (2002) and from Baily, Hulten and Campbell (1992)
(BHC) and its derivatives (e.g. Olley and Pakes, (1996), and Foster, Haltiwanger
and Krizan 2001). The main dierence between our denition of reallocation and
all of these variants is that they are not based on denitions of APG that equal
the change in nal demand minus the change in expenditures on labor and capital.
1Our Stata code, which is available at the authors' websites, contains three dierent estimation approaches
for production functions and illustrates how to construct estimate of the gaps from them.
2This weakens their link to the theory literature on reallocation and growth (see
e.g. Aghion and Howitt (1992) or Caballero and Hammour (1996) and the large
literature that has followed). A second important dierence with some of these al-
ternative approaches is that we avoid the use of cost shares to estimate production
function parameters or markups because the theory that motivates doing so does
not hold when the cost function is not dierentiable, as in any s-S type setting
like a world with adjustment costs for labor or capital.2
We illustrate our approach using plant-level data from 1982-1994 in Chile, one of
Latin America's fastest growing countries in the late 80s and 90s. Many economists
have attributed Chile's economic growth to the measures taken in the 1970s to
reduce economic frictions. We look at the magnitudes of gaps at Chilean man-
ufacturing rms across the period 1982-1996. While we nd negligible gaps for
materials across estimators and small gaps for electricity inputs, we nd large gaps
for blue and white collar labor inputs. On average, the gaps for labor equal ap-
proximately one year's salary for both blue and white collar. The nding implies
that increasing labor by one unit at rms with positive gaps and decreasing labor
by one unit at rms with negative gaps leads to an increase in value added of
0.5%.
We then look for an impact on allocative eciency of two increases in the cost of
dismissing workers.3 In 1984, Chile no longer exempted rms from severance pay
when they could demonstrate \economic cause" for dismissal. Severance was set
equal to no less than a month's wages per year of tenure, with a ve month ceiling.
In 1991 the ceiling increased to 11 months. We look at the gaps for blue and white
collar labor right before and after the two policy changes. We nd increases in
the mean of within-rm gaps following increases in ring costs for both blue and
white collar labor. All years after 1985 have average blue and white-collar gaps
that are signicantly dierent from every year prior to 1985, and the biggest jump
in the gaps occurs right after the rst increase in ring costs.
Economic theory says that a variety of changes can impact plant-level gaps and
2See Bentolila and Bertola (1990) who provide evidence of non-dierentiable adjustment costs for labor and
also Caballero and Engel (1993) and Caballero and Engel (1999) who provide similar evidence for capital. See
also the discussion in Bond and Van Reenen (2007).
3Most of the empirical work on ring costs focuses on whether employment levels increase or decrease (see
Heckman and Pages (2004)). The evidence has largely been mixed, probably because the theory says that
ring costs, when they do have an impact, lead some rms to hold too much labor and others to hold too little.
Depending upon the assumptions, some theory papers nd a positive eect of increasing ring costs on employment
(Bentolila and Bertola (1990), Alvarez and Veracierto (2001)), while others nd a negative eect (Risager and
Sorensen (1997), Bertola (1990), and Hopenhayn and Rogerson (1993)). Both Edwards and Edwards (2000), who
use aggregate time-series data, and Pages and Montenegro (1999), who use individual-level employment survey
data, nd no eect of these increases on aggregate unemployment levels.
3we try to isolate the impact of ring costs from other changes occurring in the
economy. We show that dierent policies can have implications for gaps that vary
across inputs and one can use these dierences to try to isolate the impact of a
policy change on allocative eciency. Lemma 2 provides one result, showing that
policies that impact adjustment costs for inputs like labor or capital only aect
the marginal revenue product (MRP) gaps associated with those inputs. Inputs
without adjustment costs should not have their gaps change, so these inputs can
act as controls in the spirit of a dierence-in-dierences approach to identication.
We then look at the MRP gaps for materials and electricity right before and
after the policy change. We nd no evidence of any increase in the gaps for
either materials or electricity across the time periods. In summary, our approach
identies a signicant fall in allocative eciency for both blue and white collar
labor in the 1980s, and both the timing of the gap changes and the fact that
\freely variable" inputs did not experience MRP gap changes suggest at least part
of the decrease in allocative eciency may have occurred because of the increase
in ring costs.
We undertake a series of checks to test the robustness of our results.4 In partic-
ular, we examine robustness to: (i) using two alternative production functions; (ii)
using an alternative denition of the productivity residual; (iii) using two tests to
address potential measurement error in wages; (iv) using a sample-split test based
on excess turnover rates (to see if industries with greater voluntary turnover are
less aected by increases in job security); (iv) dierences in industry unionization
rates (to control for changes in bargaining environment that would likely impact
unionized industry more strongly); (v) using an alternative deator for nominal
gaps; and (vi) exclusion of entrants and exiters. Our main ndings are robust
to all of these checks. We also check and nd that the gaps are correlated with
probability of exit.
The paper proceeds as follows. Sections 2-4 develop the reallocation framework
and estimation methodology. Section 5 summarizes the key economic reforms in
Chile over the period that we examine (1982-1996). Section 6 describes the plant-
level data. Section 7 provide details of estimation, and Section 8 presents the
baseline results and robustness checks. Section 9 concludes.
4We thank an anonymous referee for suggesting or prompting a number of these tests.
42 Measuring Lost Output Due to Allocative Ineciency
We use the accounting framework from Petrin and Levinsohn (2011) to derive
aggregate productivity growth from the micro-level and derive the reallocation
terms. Readers not interested in the details can skip to Section 2.1 and then
directly to implementation in Section 4.
We assume there are at most N plants in the economy each of which produces
one good.5 Each plant i's production technology is given by
Q
i(Xi;Mi;!i); (1)
where Xi = (Xi1;:::;XiK) is the vector of K primary input amounts (types of
labor and capital) used at plant i, Mi = (Mi1;:::;MiJ) is the vector giving the
amount of each plant j's output used as an intermediate input at plant i, and
!i is the level of plant i's technical eciency. Fi is equal to the sum of all xed
and sunk costs at i, and we normalize these costs to the equivalent of the forgone
output and deduct them, letting Qi = Qi(Xi;Mi;!i)   Fi: The total amount of
output from plant i that goes to nal demand Yi is then






j Mji is the total amount of i's output that serves as intermediate input
within the plant and at other plants.
We operate in continuous time (suppressing t), so the dierential for i's nal
demand is given as dYi = dQi  
P
j dMij: Letting Pi denote the price of plant i's
output, aggregate productivity growth (APG) is the dierence between the change










where Wik equals the unit cost to i of the kth primary input and dXik is the change
in the use of that primary input at plant i, and the summation is taken over all
plants.6
5Any of the N products may potentially be used as an input in production. The setup extends to multi-product
plants.
6In the general setup from Petrin and Levinsohn (2011) the path of primary and intermediate inputs and
productivity shocks for rm i is given as Zit = (Xit;Mit;!it), t 2 [0;1]. For the entire economy they
write Zt = (Z1t;Z2t;:::;ZNt). Given Zt, output quantities are determined by the production technolo-
gies and Qt = (Q1t(Z1t);:::;QNt(ZNt)). Prices are assumed to be uniquely determined by Qt, given as
Pt = (P1t(Qt);:::;PNt(Qt)), and similarly for primary input costs Wt = (W1t(Zt);:::;WKt(Zt))). Fixed
and sunk costs for all i are deterministic given Zt and its past values, and the vector of xed costs is given as
Ft = (F1t;:::;FNt). Yit can then be directly calculated for all i and t 2 [0;1].































@Mj are the partial derivatives of the output production function
with respect to the kth primary input and the jth intermediate input respectively,
dMij is the change in intermediate input j at plant i, dFi is the change in xed
and sunk costs,
@Qi
@!i is the partial derivative of the output function with respect




@!i d!i are the gains from technical eciency changes and  
P
i PidFi is the
value of lost output arising from any incurred xed or sunk costs. In this paper
we focus on the reallocation terms which are given by the rst two terms from (3).
2.1 Linking the Gaps to Allocative Eciency
The reallocation terms are based on the value of the marginal products (VMP)
for every input, given generically for any input Xk at rm i as:




The reallocation terms include a VMP term and an input cost term for each plant

















Using labor as an example, assuming common wages, reallocation of a unit of
labor from j to i would lead dLi = 1 and dLj =  1, and would thus increase the







while holding total labor input constant. This thought experiment motivates the
following measure of forgone output, which is written in terms of labor but can be
applied to any input.
Lemma 1. The average absolute gap across rms between labor's value of marginal
product and wage equals the average productivity gain from adjusting labor by one
unit in the optimal direction at every rm, holding all else constant.
6Proof. Dene indicator variable Di as the unit adjustment of labor in the optimal































   : (6)
Equation (6) provides a simple lower bound approximation to the potential ef-
ciency gains to the economy from moving \one-step" in the direction of being
more ecient. (6) is partial equilibrium in nature and assumes the economy is not
constrained in a way that makes this labor reallocation impossible.7
For counterfactuals we let E0 and E1 denote the two dierent states. For
example, E0 might denote the state of the economy with ring costs and E1
might denote the economy after all ring costs have been eliminated. We use the
path of the movements of inputs, outputs, and prices between E0 and E1 over the
interval t 2 [0;1] (see footnote 8).
We use the reallocation terms to dene the change in aggregate productivity






















As a simple example, consider the case of a single (labor) input rm facing an
innitely elastic labor supply curve. Suppose the rm starts from an economic
environment (E0) where the rm has a positive gap between the VMP for labor
and the wage as illustrated in Figure 1. This gap could be due to any type of
friction, including ring costs, a tax on wages, or a markup charged by the rm.
Eliminating the entire gap moves the rm to the socially optimal labor level L.
The allocative eciency gain would be equal to the area traced out below the
VMP curve and above the wage curve.
7It also does not include any real adjustment costs (like retraining) associated with the labor movements.
73 Input Demand with Adjustment Costs
We illustrate how market power and adjustment costs impact the allocative e-
ciency measure given in (7) using a simple dynamic model of input demand based
on Bentolila and Bertola (1990). The production function is given as Q(!t;Lt)
and is assumed dierentiable, increasing and concave in labor Lt (the one input),
and with demand/productivity shock !t. !t is stochastic so the rm is uncertain
about future demand/productivity, and it is realized before the labor decision is
made. Wages are exogenously set at Wt per unit of labor and there are linear,
asymmetric hiring (H) and ring (F) costs given as:
C(dL) = (1[dL>0]H   1[dL<0]F)dL:
We allow the rm to have some market power and assume monopoly pricing with
current prices only a function of current output quantity, given as P(Q). The rm
then chooses an employment policy that maximizes the expected present value of







 r( t)f(P(Q)Q(!;L)   WL)d   C(dL)g

: (8)
























is the elasticity of demand. The solution to this maximization
problem depends on the current demand shock and beliefs about their future path,



























= H if dLt > 0: (11)
In this setting only when the rm faces an innite price elasticity of demand and
there are no ring costs will the value of the marginal product (VMP) be equated
to the wage. Otherwise, none of the three conditions above have optimizing rms
equating the value of the marginal product with marginal cost. Instead, when
ring, the rm chooses labor such that the discounted expected MRP l given up
is equal to the discounted cost of wages saved minus the ring cost. When hiring,
8the rm chooses labor to equate the discounted expected MRP l to the discounted
cost of wages plus today's hiring cost. There is also a range of realized values for
!t such that the rm does not adjust, in which case the dierence between the
discounted expected MRP l and the discounted wage falls within the range [-F,H].
Note that (9)-(11) make it clear that denitions of reallocation based on the use
of cost shares are not consistent in the face of these types of adjustment costs as
the rst-order conditions from cost minimization no longer imply cost shares are
equal to production function parameters (or markups times these parameters).
With markups but no ring costs, the optimal choice of labor in each period t
equates marginal revenue with marginal cost, and the rm hires or res in every
period to exactly equate the marginal revenue product with the wage. A coun-
terfactual that eliminated ring costs but not market power would calculate how
allocative eciency as measured by (7) improves as the economy moves from a
setting where rms use the decision rules from (9)-(11) to the setting where rms
choose labor equating MRP l = W in every period.
3.1 The Information in \Freely Adjustable" Input Gaps
Inputs without adjustment costs will have MRP gaps that respond to some changes
in economic environments but not others, making them useful as \controls" for
some questions. We extend the setup to consider the case of a 2-input production
function that involves labor and another \freely adjustable" input Mt, with a unit
price of P m
t .
Denition 1. An input M is dened as \freely adjustable" if C(dM) = 0.







 r( t) f(P(Q)Q(L;M;!)   WL   P
m
 M)d   C(dL)g

(12)
Lemma 2 gives the decision rule for M.
Lemma 2. Assume P() and Q() are dierentiable and C(dM) = 0. Assume
there exists a unique interior solution for M conditional on L. Then a prot
maximizing rm equates the marginal revenue product of M to its marginal cost
P m conditional on the level of chosen labor.
Proof. (12) is dierentiable in M so prot maximization holds if and only if con-
ditional on L the marginal revenue product of M is equal to the marginal cost of
M for all t.
9Optimization for labor choice yields the same conditions as in equation (9),
(10), and (11), except that the expression for marginal revenue product for labor
for any L will be calculated conditional on the optimal level of materials for that
given L. The key point is conditional on the chosen labor level the marginal
revenue product of any freely adjustable input will equal the contemporaneous
marginal cost of that input.
The main implication for our approach is that a general change in the com-
petitive environment that aects markups or a change in the tax on output will
generally aect all input gaps, while a change in adjustment costs for one input
will not aect the MRP gaps for inputs that do not have adjustment costs. Thus
if VMP gaps on labor (e.g.) increase but MRP gaps on electricity and materials
do not, whatever is aecting allocative eciency of labor is unrelated to a change
in markups or taxes on output.
4 The Gap Methodology
In this section we provide an overview of how VMP and MRP gaps can be esti-
mated using plant-level data. Appendix C contains the detailed description of the
approach to production function estimation and the calculation of these gaps.
We start with a Cobb-Douglas production function specication in order to





it + kkit + mmit + eeit + vvit + "it; (13)
where qit is the log of the real output, mit is log of real value of intermediate
materials, ls
it is the log of the number of skilled (white collar) employees, lu
it is the
log of the number of unskilled (blue collar) employees, kit is the log of the real
capital stock employed, eit is log of electricity purchased (quantity), and vit is log
of the services used by rm i in year t. The productivity shock is given as:
"it = !it + it;
with !it representing a transmitted component and it representing an iid (unex-
pected) productivity shock.
Given values for the production function (which we estimate in several dierent



















10where the capitalized variables are levels of the logged variables dened above.
Multiplying this marginal product by the plant's output price yields the value of
the marginal product V MP s
it.
The absolute value of the gap between the value of the marginal product and
marginal input price for skilled and unskilled labor, Gs
it and Gu
it, and for materials
Gm
it and electricity Ge
it are given by:
G
u




























it denote the wage rate for unskilled (blue-collar) and skilled
(white-collar) labor respectively, P m
it is the price for materials and P e
it is the price
for electricity.8 These gaps are in nominal terms, so we deate using the consumer
price index, giving:




We also posit and estimate the parameters of a Cobb-Douglas revenue function,
and using the estimated parameters, we construct estimates of the gap between
MRP and input prices. A sucient condition for a Cobb-Douglas revenue function
to hold is to have an iso-elastic demand curve and a Cobb-Douglas production































The procedure to estimate these parameters is very similar to that used to estimate
the production function parameters, except that here we used the revenue directly
(deated by CPI to improve comparability over time).
5 The Chilean Job Security Reforms
Firing costs are pervasive around the world (see Figure 2, which is taken from
Heckman and Pages (2004)). Theoretically it is an open question as to whether
8These gaps are linear in the value marginal product and the wage. In terms of rates of convergence,
p
n
consistency of the gap follows directly from
p
n consistency of estimators for each of these components, which
has been established for the most commonly used production function estimators.
11they have any impact on economic eciency as market participants may be able
to undo the distortion.9 In Chile, workers have traditionally been provided with
job security through three means: advance notices for dismissal, limitations on the
use of xed-term labor contracts, and severance payments on dismissal.10 Over
the 1981-1994 sample period, advance notice was unchanged at one month, and
we know of no evidence of signicant changes in the use of xed-term contracts.
Severance payments did change substantially on two occasions, particularly for
workers that were red for \economic" reasons. We look at these changes for
evidence of an impact on economic eciency.
There are two types of red workers in Chile, those red \justly" and those
red \unjustly." \Just cause" was dened in the Immobility Law of 1966, and it
stated that criminal behavior and absenteeism (for example) qualied as reasons
to re someone without paying severance. Under this law, economic and nancial
needs were technically \just."
In 1978, the Pinochet administration started requiring rms to pay one month's
wages per year of service, subject to no upper limit, for any worker dismissed
for \unjustied reasons." The Labor Plan of 1980 formalized this arrangement,
mandating that severance packages be part of the overall job contract negotiated
between the employee and the employer. It applied to all labor contracts signed
after August 1981, and it restricted the minimum severance package for \unjusti-
ed reasons" to one month's wages per year of service, subject to a maximum of
ve months.
The rst signicant enhancement in job security during the sample period oc-
curred in June 1984, when economic and nancial needs were reclassied to \un-
justied." Then, in December 1990, the new democratic regime strengthened the
provision. While technically reclassifying rings for economic and nancial di-
culties as \just," the severance package for unjust rings became the package for
\just" rings, and it was further strengthened by raising the maximum severance
package from ve to eleven months' wages, one month per year employed. The
9Lazear (1990) shows how the distortion introduced by these provisions can potentially be completely undone
by ecient contracts, where the mandated ring costs are passed on to workers who willingly accept a lower
wage. In Appendix A, we look carefully at Lazear's critique in the context of Chile. Also, in a paper examining
incentive eects of unemployment insurance in Chile, Hartley, Ours and Vodopivec (2010) note in a footnote
that anecdotal evidence suggests that employers may reach agreement upon dismissal to pay less than the legal
amount or change the cause of dismissal to avoid payment. Any empirical eects of the job security changes
we nd could then be interpreted as showing that regulatory stringency did actually increase in practice. Also,
while there may still have been negotiated settlements below mandated rates, the regulation could have aected
the extent of actual severance negotiated between the rm and the worker as it aects the threat point for the
workers (and so in turn could aect rm labor choices).
10This section draws heavily from the comprehensive treatment given in Edwards and Edwards (2000).
12law also charged the employer a further 20% penalty when economic cause could
not be established to the satisfaction of the court.11
Pag es and Montenegro (1999) construct the following index for the expected















with  denoting the discount factor,  the probability of retention, b the cost
of advance notice, at the probability that economic diculties of the rm are
considered \just," SJ
t+s the payment under justied cause, and SU
t+s the payment




t+s + (1   at)SU
t+s

is the expected cost associated with ring
at that time.12
Figure 3 is calculated using their best estimates for a rm in Chile, and it shows
that ring costs in the pre-1984 period were low, close to 0.75 months of wages, and
were primarily determined by the cost of advance notice.13 Expected discounted
cost increased to 2.2 months wages after the rst reform in mid-1984, and then
again to 3 months wages after the second reform. To put this into context for 41
OECD and Latin American countries together, Chile went from having one of the
smallest levels of ring costs to being above the sample median of 2 months wages,
although remaining well below the 10-14 month range of Colombia, Brazil, Peru,
and Ecuador (see Figure 2).14
11The term \just" rings or dismissals is based on the phrasing of the Chilean labor law and taken from Edwards
and Edwards (2000). The equivalent terminology in UK labor law and other contexts is \fair" dismissals.
12A more comprehensive approach would have indices for both the rm and the worker, Cijt, although this
calculation would require matched employer-employee data.
13They assume  equal to 0.92,  equal to 0.88, b equal to 1, at starting at 0.8, falling to 0 from 1985-1990, and
then increasing in 1991 to 0.9, SJ
t+s zero until 1990 when it increases to one month's pay for every year worked
up to 11 months maximum, and SU
t+s at one month's pay for every year worked up to 5 month's maximum, for
1981-1990, and then increasing to 1.2 month's pay for every year worked up to a maximum of 11 months.
14There are a number of other political and economic changes taking place over the sample period, many of
which have been analyzed elsewhere. The Labor Plan reduced payroll taxes substantially in 1981. Gruber (1997)
reports that these reductions were fully passed on to wages with no eect on unemployment. The bargaining
power of unions was relatively low through the 1980s under the military government, but increased under reforms
introduced by the democratic regime in 1991. Using aggregate data and time series analysis, Edwards and
Edwards (2000) nd that reduction of payroll taxes and decentralization of bargaining increased labor market
exibility and contributed to a reduction in unemployment. Finally, there was a severe recession in 1982 related to
the Latin American debt crisis and the fall in copper prices, a major Chilean export. The recovery was also quite
remarkable, with wages increasing at 5% a year and unemployment falling from 17% to 5.5% in the post-recession
period.
136 The Data and Variables
6.1 Data
We use the annual Chilean Manufacturing Census (Encuesta Nacional Industrial
Anual) conducted by the Chilean government statistical oce (Instituto Nacional
de Estadistica). The survey covers all manufacturing plants in Chile with more
than 10 employees and has been conducted annually since 1979. There are about
5000 rms every year, with an entry rate and exit rate of about 5 percent over
the panel period. We use data on the 1982-1994 period in our analysis of the
gaps. Starting our analysis in 1982 eliminates the eects of the large downturn in
manufacturing in 1981 (see Appendix Figure A.3).
This survey has been used in a number of previous studies.15 The survey pro-
vides an industry indicator, and measures of output, inputs, wages, employment
and investment. A detailed description of how the longitudinal samples were com-
bined into a panel from 1979-1986 can be found in Liu (1991). We extended this
to 1996 following broadly the procedure used by Liu. Further, we supplemented
the raw data with 3-digit price series for output, machinery and inputs from other
sources including IMF's IFS database, data on price indices obtained from the
Chilean government statistical oce, and data from Edwards and Edwards (2000)
and Edwards and Edwards (1991).16
6.2 Output, Input, Price Measures and Capital
Plant-level real output is total revenue deated with a 4-digit industry output
deator obtained from the Web site of the Chilean Government's statistical of-
ce. We see total person years for dierent types of laborers and aggregate into
blue and white collar workers. Real materials and services are both aggregates
at the plant-level, and each have their own 3-digit price deator. Over 30,000
plant-year observations report zero fuel use, so we deate fuels with its own ag-
gregator and combine them with materials.17 Services purchased include freight,
insurance, rent, accounting, communications, advertising, and technical support.
Real electricity input is the reported quantity of electricity purchased. Electricity
price is dened as the value of electricity expenditures divided by the quantity of
electricity purchased.
The real capital series is constructed using the perpetual inventory method,
15See Levinsohn and Petrin (2003) and citations therein.
16We thank Andr es Hernando for providing us with some of these deators.
17Results are robust to dropping these observations.
14described in detail in Appendix D. Data on book value of capital is available for
the years 1980-81 and 1992-96. We use the same methodology as Liu (1991) to
construct the capital series for all rms for which we have data on book value
for 1980-1991. For other rms, we build capital series backward and forward
using the data on book value available for 1992-96. As in Liu, we assume a
5% depreciation rate for buildings, a 10% depreciation rate for machinery, and a
20% depreciation rate for vehicles. We use a deator for the construction sector
to deate investments in buildings and use a deator for machinery to deate
investments in both machinery and vehicles.
6.3 Wage Rate Measure
At each rm we observe the total wage bill for several types of laborers. The
components of the wages are given as Wages, Bonus, Payroll Taxes, and Family
Allowance Taxes. We divide the total wage bill by the number of workers to get
the average wage, and we use this estimate of the average wage to approximate
the marginal wage.
We examine general trends in the average real wage rates in Figure A1 (obtained
by deating the wage rate in our plant-level data using the output deator). From
separate sources we have unemployment and ination rates across the sample
period in Figure A2 and manufacturing growth in Figure A3. We nd that both
blue and white collar real wages dropped until the mid 1980s and then grew
through the late 1980s and early 1990s. The positive increase over most of the
sample period occurs along with positive manufacturing growth in every year.
While there is not an explicit category for ring costs, our understanding is
these costs appear in the wage bill when they are incurred by the rm.18 For
plants that re workers, this causes the estimated average wage to be higher than
the marginal wage. For blue collar workers we estimate the size of this error using
an observed probability of ring of 39.2% (from Table 6 of an earlier version of
our paper (Petrin and Sivadasan (2006)), an observed average fraction of workers
red given a ring spell of 17.9% (from Table 7 of Petrin and Sivadasan (2006)),
and an average tenure of 5 years for workers, which leads to a maximum payment
for the rst increase in ring costs. The product of these terms suggests that the
estimated average wage overestimates the marginal wage by 2.8% which is small
relative to the size of the gaps and the change in the gaps over time that we report
in Section 8. We also note that we nd approximately 62% of the estimated gaps
for both blue and white collar labor are positive, and for these plants the error
18Dr. Cox-Edwards advised us on this point. Our results are robust to using only Wages and Bonus.
15reduces the magnitude of the estimated gap relative to its true size. We undertake
further tests addressing the potential impact of wage mis-measurement in Section
8 but nd no evidence that this mis-measurement could explain either the size of
the gaps or their change over time.
7 Estimation
There are some important issues that a researcher will confront in practice: es-
timation of production function parameters and simultaneity, functional form for
production, observing revenues versus quantities, measurement error in estimated
productivity, and estimation of input prices. We discuss each in turn.
A wide variety of production function estimators are available to researchers
using plant-level (or industry level) panel data. In the baseline analysis, we employ
the approach proposed by Wooldridge (2009) that synthesizes ideas to address the
simultaneity problem from Levinsohn-Petrin (2003) and Olley and Pakes (1996),
while also addressing the critique of these approaches by Ackerberg, Caves and
Fraser (2006). We use the proxy variable (materials) proposed by LP to investment
proxy proposed by OP because of the well-known lumpiness of investment in plant-
level data. We estimate the production function separately by 3-digit industry to
allow these parameters to vary by industry. Also, given that the job security
reforms introduce adjustment costs to labor inputs, we treat blue and white collar
labor as state variables (in addition to capital) in the estimation. Appendix C has
more details on the estimation approach as well as a discussion of estimates and
overidentication tests.19
As in many plant-level data sets we observe plant-level revenues and not prices
and quantities separately. Two approaches have been proposed to deal with pro-
duction function estimation in this case. One approach deates plant-level rev-
enues by an industry price-deator and then uses deated revenues as the de-
pendent variable in the production function regressions. Production function
estimates are consistent if inputs are not correlated with the deviation of the
plant-level price from the industry price index. An alternative is to assume that
demand takes a particular functional form and use that functional form to back
out a price control, as in Klette and Griliches (1996). While both approaches have
their weaknesses, we follow the predominant approach in the literature and use
the former.
When constructing an estimate of the value of the marginal product in the
19Programs available in a Programming Appendix at: http://webuser.bus.umich.edu/jagadees/other/chile code.htm
16face of this price measurement error, we use the entire error from the production
function estimates. Since this includes the ratio of the plant-level price to the
industry price, we then multiply this estimate by the industry price deator so
only the plant-level price times the marginal product remains. For example, with
the Cobb-Douglas production specication considered in Section 4, for skilled labor











with Pht the industry price deator. We then multiply this by Pht to recover the
value of the marginal product.
Another issue relates to whether the estimated error from the production func-
tion is all productivity, or whether it also contains measurement error in quantity.
When the estimate of the marginal product is undertaken, the \error" that should
be used is the part of the error that is productivity. In our baseline estimates, we
condition on the full error term, but we also check robustness to estimating and
conditioning on the predictable (transmitted) component of the error term.
Finally, input prices are sometimes reported in plant-level data, but more often
one observes total expenditures on the inputs and total units of the input, so the
average input price will often be used in place of the marginal price.
8 The Gap Results for Chile, 1982-1994
8.1 Baseline Results
Over the entire sample period, we observe 43,675 gaps for blue collar, with 9,558
observations in the three-year period prior to the rst reform (1982, 1983 and
1984), 18,852 observations in the period between the two reforms (from 1985-1990),
and 15,265 observations in the four year period after the second reform (from 1991-
1994). Before conditioning on plant-specic dierences and other observed control
variables, we analyze the unconditional means and medians of the gap distribution.
The average (median) unconditional gaps for blue collar labor in real terms
across the three periods are 79 (33), 107 (35), and 112 (41) thousand pesos.20 The
average (median) unconditional gaps for white collar labor across periods are 124
(69), 155 (83), and 173 (95) thousand pesos. These compare to average wages in
our data of 77 thousand pesos a year for blue collar workers and 158 thousand
pesos a year for white collar workers. Thus the average gaps are close to or more
20All results are report in real 1979 Chilean pesos.
17than a year's wage for both types of workers. The gaps are also growing over time
for both types of laborers.
In Table 1, we summarize the changes in the gaps across the three periods for
blue collar labor, white collar labor, materials, and electricity. In each column the
absolute value of the gap for the input is the dependent variable. All regressions
include two period-indicators for the dierent degrees of job security, one for 1985-
1990, and one for 1991-1994. Columns 2, 4, 6, and 8 also include the industry
output growth rate as a control for industry level demand shocks. We include plant
xed eects which allow for base-period plant-specic gaps, so the magnitudes of
the period dummies are identied by within-plant variation in the mean gap over
time.
From Lemma 1 we know that the average absolute gap for an input in any
period is an approximate measure of the potential gain in productivity from a
unit adjustment of that input in the optimal direction. The results in Table 1
suggest that, in the base period, the potential gain from a unit adjustment in
blue collar labor was 84 thousand pesos per year, and for white collar labor it was
139 thousand pesos per year. In the second period, potential gains from a unit
adjustment for both the blue collar and the white collar gaps increase signicantly,
by 23 thousand pesos and 18 thousand pesos respectively. In the third period, the
blue collar gap increases slightly (by about 2 thousand pesos), while the the white
gap increases further, by almost 6 thousand pesos relative to the second period.
The longer tenure of white collar workers is consistent with a bigger change in
response to the second increase in job security.21 For the base period, a one-step
move of blue-collar labor in the \right" direction leads to almost a 0.5% increase
in value added.
Using the same regressions, Figure 4 more closely examines the statistical signif-
icance of the year-to-year indicator variables relative to 1984 for both the absolute
value of the gap for blue and white collar labor. The two horizontal lines indicate
the average level of the gap in 1984 for blue and white collar labor. Condence
intervals for yearly indicator variables that do not contain the line are signicantly
dierent from the 1984 level. All nine of the blue collar as well as white-collar
year dummies after 1985 are signicantly dierent from 1984.
The timing of the results are consistent with the timing of the job security
changes. The labor gaps are fairly level for white collar employees in the pre-
change period until 1985, when they increase in 1986-87 after the rst application
21Results are robust to log specications, and the results are similar to what we report for the levels specica-
tions. When working in levels, we replace the biggest 2.5% of the gaps with the value of the 97.5th percentile,
and similarly for the smallest 2.5% of the gaps (i.e. we winsorize the observations by 2.5% on both tails).
18of job security. For blue collar, there are some increases in the gap in 1984 and
1985, but a bigger increase in 1986-87. The gaps decline somewhat by 1990 for
both blue and white collar, but increase again in 1991, at the time of the second
increase in job security (though this increase is smaller than the jump in 1986).
By Lemma 2 we know if changes in markups or output taxes (e.g.) are the
cause for the increased gap between labor VMP and wages that we see in in Table
1 then we should see this change drive a gap between MRP and input prices for
all inputs. In Table 2 we report estimates of the marginal revenue product gaps
for materials and electricity. Examining the VMP results in columns 5-8 of Table
1 for materials and electricity as well as the MRP results in Table 2 we nd that
in contrast to the patterns for labor inputs, there is no increase in VMP or MRP
gap for either materials or electricity across the two periods 1985-1990 and 1991
on. Thus, whatever the reason for the increase in gaps for labor input the results
suggest it is not a \friction" that aects all inputs.
We compare the year-to-year timing of the changes in gaps across inputs. Figure
5 plots the coecients on the year dummy variables that come from regressing the
absolute value of the gap for the input on industry output growth rate (as a control
for industry level demand shocks) as well as plant specic xed eects which allow
for base-year (1981) plant-specic gaps. Gaps for all inputs are normalized to 100
in 1984 for this comparison. The graph tells a story similar to the above tables,
with labor input gaps increasing and materials and electricity gaps decreasing
slightly.
8.2 Robustness Checks
In this section we examine robustness to: (i) alternative production functions;
(ii) an alternative denition of the productivity residual; (iii) measurement error
in wages; (iv) dierences in excess worker turnover; (v) dierences in industry
unionization rates; (vi) use of an alternative deator for nominal gaps; and (vii)
exclusion of entrants and exiters. Our main ndings are robust to all of these
checks. We also show gaps are correlated with probability of exit.
8.2.1 Alternative Production Function Specications
We use the same specication as in equation (17) but estimate it using plant-level
xed eects that vary by the three time periods. This estimator is consistent if
!it = !ip where p stands for one of the three time periods (period 1 is 1982-1984,
period 2 is 1985 to 1990, and period 3 is 1991-1994). The results, presented in
19columns 1 to 4 of Table 3, are similar to those in the baseline Table 1. We nd
slightly larger increases for blue- and white-collar gaps in both periods. Contrary
to the base case, we nd a slight increase in the blue-collar gap, and a slight decline
in the white-collar gap, from period 2 to 3. As in the base case, we nd declines
in the gap for both materials and electricity.
One drawback of the Cobb-Douglas specication in equation (17) is that the
elasticities of output with respect to individual inputs are restricted to be constant
and the elasticity of substitution between inputs is restricted to be one. As an



















it + "it (16)
where i indexes plants, t indexes years, j and k index the dierent inputs. We
estimate the translog production function using the same xed eects. The gap
results using the translog production function are presented in columns 5 to 8 of
Table 3. Again we nd broadly the same patterns as in the basecase in Table 1
both for the labor inputs and the control inputs.
8.2.2 Using Transmitted Component of Productivity
In this section, we check robustness of the results to conditioning on only the
transmitted component of productivity. As discussed in Section 4, if it arises
essentially from measurement error in output then this term should be eliminated
from the productivity residual when estimating the marginal product. In order to
eliminate it, we form an estimator for !it in the following way. First, we run the
rst stage regression of output on variable inputs and a polynomial in capital and
the proxy variable and obtain the predicted output level ( ^ qit) from this regression.
This yields the output net of the unpredicted part of the productivity term it.
Then we subtract the contribution of the inputs using the coecient estimates
obtained earlier, so that we get ^ !it = ^ qit ( ^ sls
it+ ^ ulu
it+ ^ kkit+ ^ mmit+ ^ eeit+ ^ vvit).
The results are presented in Table 4. These are qualitatively similar to that in
baseline case in Table 1.
8.2.3 Measurement Error in Wages
In Section 6.3 we showed that a simple estimate of the amount of error introduced
into the gap estimate and its change by the inability to separate severance pay
from the wage bill is small. Here we further explore the issue by noting that the
measurement error does not arise for plants that do not re workers. Thus, the
20average industry wage rate in plants that increased employment may provide an
unbiased estimate for the going market wage rate. Specically, for all plants in




(WAGEBILLijt   WAGEBILLijt 1):ILijt>10%;W>0 P
(Lijt   Lijt 1):ILijt>10%;W>0
where ILijt>10%;W>0 is an indicator dummy =1 for plant i in sector j in period
t if it experienced an increase in blue collar employment greater than 10% and
experienced an increase in the blue collar wage bill. We dene the proxy for
marginal wage for white collar wages similarly. We rerun our gap estimates using
these industry-level wage rates and the results are presented in Table 5 (columns
1 to 4). We nd that the baseline results are quite robust to using this alternative
measure of wages.
We also look at how the gaps change for just the plants that have positive gaps.
As we noted in Section 6.3, the upward bias in measured wage for rms that re
workers leads to a downward bias on measured absolute gaps for observations with
positive gaps. The results from examining this subsample are presented in Table
5 (columns 5 to 8). We continue to nd signicant increases in both blue and
white collar gaps in the periods after the passage of the laws relative to the period
before the laws.
8.2.4 Conditioning on Excess Worker Turnover
In industries that have relatively high voluntary worker turnover managers should
have more exibility to adjust employment levels down without ring workers.
If the increases in the gap for blue and white collar labor are indeed driven by
the changes in ring costs we expect these increases to be lower in industries that
have higher voluntary worker turnover rates. Combining this with the expectation
that mandated severance payments should have no eect on the gaps for the
freely adjustable inputs, we get a test in the spirit of dierence-in-dierence-in-
dierences.
We proxy for the extent of Chilean industry-level voluntary turnover using
U.S. excess worker turnover (dened as worker turnover less job turnover). Data
on job and worker turnover are obtained form the quarterly workforce indicator
(QWI) database, which is based on data from the LEHD.22 We collected data
22The QWI database by SIC code is available at http://lehd.did.census.gov/led/datatools/qwiappssic.html.
Detailed documentation on the construction of the QWI is presented in Abowd et al (2005). Because the LEHD
does not track the reason for separations, data on voluntary separations (or quits) is not available in the QWI.
21by 3-digit SIC code for 1995, which we cross-linked with the ISIC based industry
classication in the Chilean data using a concordance between the SIC 3-digit
code and the ISIC 3-digit code.
We then split out sample into two groups. One group contains estimated gaps
from plants in industries with excess turnover above the median and the second
group contains the plants in industries below the median. In Table 6, we nd the
increases in gaps for blue-collar and white-collar worker (in columns 1 and 2) are
bigger in magnitude for plants below the median. This pattern holds for both
period 2 and period 3 and for both blue and white collar workers. The results
for materials and electricity (columns 3 and 4) do not show systematically larger
increases in gaps for plants below the median in either period 2 or period 3. The
evidence is thus consistent with at least some of the increase in the labor gaps
being attributable to the increase in ring costs.23
8.2.5 A Sample-split Test Based on Unionization Rate
As discussed in Edwards and Edwards (E&E) (1999), new laws on unions' rights
and collective bargaining went into eect in 1991. According to E&E, the law
change was intended \to move collective bargaining away from the centralized
European model to the decentralized United States model." Dierent indices re-
lated to the collective bargaining process indicate that \labor unions became less
important, and the process itself became more decentralized." In particular, a
bargaining index constructed by E&E suggests more decentralization after 1991.
E&E also examine labor unrest index and nd a decline in the post-1992 period
(after a spike around 1991-1992).
We expect the main eect of changes in the bargaining and quality of labor
relations to be on the level of wages and labor costs, which is captured in our
wage measure and not necessarily in the gaps. Nevertheless, as a robustness check
we examine the changes in gaps separately for industries above and below the
median unionization rate. We expect any bias from changes in bargaining power
to disproportionately aect those industries with higher unionization rates.
We use data from the Social Protection Survey (Encuesta Proteccin Social)
The only publicly available data on we were able to locate was average for the period 1958-1979 by 2-digit
industry from Ragan (1984), based on a discontinued BLS labor turnover survey (Utter, 1982). We found very
high correlation between the excess turnover from the QWI and the quit rate in Ragan (1984) { the correlation
was 0.81, and signicant at 1%. (Starting in 2000, the US Bureau of Labor Statistics has been conducting the Job
Openings and Labor Turnover Survey (JOLTS) that does collect information on type of separation. However, per
the BLS, the sample size (16,000 units) is too small publishing data at a disaggregated 3-digit (or even 2-digit)
SIC level.)
23Results were qualitatively robust to using the OLS xed eects production function (available on request).
22which is for the years 2002-2009.24 The data for 2009 includes information on
the labor histories for each respondent (going back to 2006). For each historical
employment spell, the respondents industry of employment (4 digit ISIC) as well
as union membership status is tracked. We dene a unionization rate at the 3 digit
industry level as the fraction of observations for the industry where the respondent
reported belonging to the union.25 The results from examining samples split based
on industry unionization rates are presented in Appendix Table A.4. We nd that
the increase in average absolute gaps for white and blue collar labor is as big, if
not bigger, in industries below the median in terms of unionization rates. Again,
there is no systematic pattern of increase in either sets of industries for the control
inputs.26
8.2.6 Robustness to using an Alternative Deator
In the baseline analysis, we deate the nominal gaps with the CPI to denote all
gaps in 1979 pesos. The results from using the GDP deator are presented in
Appendix Table A.5 and are very similar to using the CPI deator.
8.2.7 Robustness to Entry and Exit
Because we use plant-level xed eects in the gaps regressions, the changes in gaps
for the period 2 (1985-1990) and period 3 (1991-1994) are identied o plants that
exist in at least 2 of the three time periods. We investigate whether changes in
composition from new entrants in period 2 that carry over to period 3 or plants
that survived from period 1 to 2 but exit in period 2 impact the results. In columns
1 to 4 of Appendix Table A.6, we restrict observations to plants that existed in at
least 2 out of the three years 1982-1984), all 6 years of period 2 (1985-1990) and
at least 2 of the 4 years of period 3 (1991-1994). In columns 5 to 8, we use a less
restrictive condition, retaining plants that existed in at least 2 years in each of
the three time periods. The results are qualitatively very similar to the baseline
results.
The checks in columns 1-4 also address a concern arising from limitations in
the measurement of capital stock. As discussed in Appendix D, for plants that
24Landerretche, Lillo, and Puentes (2011) use this survey to study the eect of unions on wages. The data was
generously provided to us by the Microdata Center at the University of Chile. In particular, we thank Esteban
Puentes for facilitating access to the data and helping us with data related questions.
25Spells corresponding to inactivity or cessation from the labor market are excluded. Also, 3-digit industries
for which we had fewer than 20 observations was excluded; this only lead to the exclusion of 4 smaller 3-digit
industries that constituted about 5% of the data we used in the baseline analysis.
26Results were qualitatively robust to using the OLS xed eects production function (available on request).
23exit the sample for short durations we assume that the investment is zero in the
missing years. This may lead to systematic mis-measurement of capital series (as
any mis-measurement in investment gets propagated when using the perpetual
inventory method to build the capital series). Because the mis-measurement due
to missing data is not a concern for the sample in columns 1-4, the robustness of
the baseline results in this sample is reassuring.
8.2.8 Correlation between Gap and Exit Hazard/Propensity
We explore whether plants with larger absolute gaps are more likely to exit using
an exponential hazard model as well as a linear probability model. We control
for size and age in both setups. Industry-year xed eects are included in the
linear model and industry and year dummies are controlled for separately in the
hazard models (where including a large number of xed eects is computationally
cumbersome). The results are presented in Appendix Table A.7. We nd that
larger blue collar gaps are indeed signicantly associated with higher exit hazard
and propensity (column 1 and column 3). We nd that the result holds for both
positive and negative blue collar gaps separately (columns 2 and 4). Similarly, we
nd in columns 5 and 6 that the white collar gaps are associated with higher exit
hazard, but this eect is not statistically signicant except in the case of negative
gaps. The eects are signicant in the linear exit propensity models (where all
eects are statistically signicant).
9 Conclusions and Extensions
In this paper we propose a new methodology to measure the impact of any type
of friction that reduces allocative eciency by driving a wedge or \gap" between
the value of the marginal product (VMP) of an input and its marginal cost. We
show that the mean absolute gap between the value of marginal product and
input price is related to allocative ineciency in terms of its impact on aggregate
productivity growth. In particular, the mean absolute gap corresponds to the
mean change in aggregate productivity from adjusting the input by one unit in
the optimal direction.
Our approach is simple, transparent, and can readily be carried out in standard
programming packages on aggregate data or the large micro-datasets that are
increasingly available for dierent countries and time periods. We discuss a number
of estimation and measurement issues relating to the application of the method
and propose a number of robustness checks to address potential concerns. In the
24context of assessing the impact of policy changes that aect adjustment costs for
particular inputs, we show how gaps for other inputs can serve as controls to
rule out changes from frictions such as output taxes and subsidies or non-optimal
managerial behavior that would be expected to aect the gaps for all inputs.
We use the VMP-input price gap to examine overall allocative ineciency in
Chile. We also focus on the eects of two mandated increases in the costs of
dismissing employees. We nd sizable gaps for blue and white collar labor even
prior to the increases in ring costs. We also nd statistically signicant changes
in the within-rm absolute gap between the marginal product of labor and the
wage for both white and blue collar workers following increases in job security.
We nd little impact on gaps for materials and electricity arising from the ring
costs. The interpretation of the results are subject to the caveat that the data
available for Chile are imperfect, as discussed and addressed to the extent possible
in Section 8.2 of the paper.
We see the main contribution of the paper as proposing a simple and novel
methodology to estimate allocative ineciency. This gap analysis is applicable to
many economic questions beyond the eects of ring costs. Our plant-level gap
statistic can be used to look for eects of any policy that introduces additional
terms to the plant's rst order condition. In terms of the allocative eciency
implications, if the gap is increasing, then willingness to pay and cost of production
diverge from one another.
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28Appendix A: Undoing the Distortion with Contracts
If there is ecient bargaining between the worker and the employer a contract can be written
specifying a side payment from the worker to the rm that fully osets the ring cost (Lazear
(1990)). Consider one such scheme for the 2-period case with no discounting and a constant
wage.27 The rm pays w in period 1 to the worker, with the worker agreeing to set aside c until
period 2. In period 2, if 2 < 1, each worker who is red receives c. All retained workers receive
w + c. If 2  1, then retained workers receive w + c and new hires get w.
This contract allows the rm to pay ring costs out of the worker's salary from the previous
period. The optimal choices of labor and the hiring and ring rule remain unchanged from the
non-distorted setting. The marginal cost faced by the rm is w in each period regardless of
whether the rm hires or res. Workers' labor force participation choice is also unaected, as
they receive the same wage as in the regime with zero ring costs. Since no distortions are
introduced into the market, eciency means welfare continues to be maximized.
Lazear (1990) argues that the ineciency may be dicult to undo using side payments for
many practical reasons. In particular, workers must be willing to make the side payments to the
employer or into an insurance fund; apprehension on the part of workers regarding the future
severance payment could prevent the distortion's undoing.28 Also, from an eciency standpoint,
ring probabilities are dependent on worker characteristics and rm layo experience, so any
unemployment insurance plan that does not condition on these factors is not going to maximize
welfare.
For an estimate of the per period reduction in wages required to oset the two job security
changes introduced in Chile, we consider two \insurance" plans. Under the rst, expected ring
costs are recovered through premium payments over the lifetime of the worker in the rm. Under
the second, the rm insures against the possibility of ring workers period by period.
A.1 Plan 1: Insuring over the Worker's Lifetime
Under this plan, wage premia are collected over the worker's tenure with the rm to oset the
expected ring costs. The fair premia for worker j is given by j, a fraction of annual wages,
and is calculated by setting the expected present value of the dismissal costs equal to the present









where  is the discount factor, j is the probability of worker j being retained, yj;t+s is the
severance cost in annual wages of ring worker j at end of s years, and T is the maximum
tenure. Assuming that all workers in a rm have identical wages and dismissal probabilities, we
can calculate the drop in wage levels (ie the premium payments) required to oset any increase
in dismissal costs. We estimate how large the fall must be to oset the rst job security reforms
introduced in Chile, assuming the interest rate (for discounting) is 5% and the maximum tenure
is 20 years.
27This contract can be written for the innite-horizon case, with the rm and the worker agreeing to a similar
arrangement period-by-period.
28Even if the workers are willing to make side payments, other problems exist, including potential moral
hazard problems like workers attempting to obtain the severance package early, or agency problems like managers
colluding with workers to extract excess severance payouts in the face of full insurance.
29Current tenure Dismissal rate Implied wage change in year 1
all new 10% -3.09%
all new 15% -4.25%
all new 20% -5.19%
all > 5 years 10% -4.17%
all > 5 years 15% -6.25%
all > 5 years 20% -8.33%
A.2 Plan 2: Insuring Period by Period over the Pool of Workers
In this approach, the rm's expected ring cost for each period is insured by collecting a premium
from all the workers of the rm. Assuming the same fraction of wages is collected from each







where j is the probability of worker j being retained, yjt is the severance cost in annual wages
of ring worker j and Nj is the number of workers in rm j. Assuming that the workers in the
rms are identical, we obtain the required drop in wage levels to pay for the insurance premia
that osets the rst increase as:
Current tenure Dismissal rate Implied wage change in year 1
all new 10% -0.83%
all new 15% -1.25%
all new 20% -1.67%
all > 5 years 10% -4.17%
all > 5 years 15% -6.25%
all > 5 years 20% -8.33%
If workers are identical and yj;t+s is constant over all j (as in the case where the tenure of
all workers exceeds 5 years), the premium payments are the same for both plans and given by
(1   )y.
Since we expect the current average tenure of typical rm to be between the extremes con-
sidered in the tables above, we guess that the fall in wages required to neutralize the Chilean
1984 dismissal cost might lie in the range of 3% to 6%. The second job security change increases
the maximum dismissal cost from 5 months to 11 months, implying an additional drop that is
similar in magnitude.
A.3 Empirical Evidence on Wages
To try to separate out the eect of job security changes on wages, we regressed the estimated
plant-level average real wage on period controls for the job security changes. The other controls
include rm xed eects, rm output growth rate, industry output and industry growth rate,
and the unemployment rate. Unfortunately, we do not observe worker-specic covariates.
We report the estimates in Appendix Table A.1. In all the specications, there is a major
decline in wages in period 2 (1985-1990). The extent of the decline, between 36% and 53%, is
much larger than that required under our oset plans. In period 3, wages recover somewhat.
Overall, there is no clear evidence that the job security changes were oset through lower wage
rates.
30Appendix B: Wage Rate Variation within Blue/White
Collar Categories
In our data there is variation in the wage rates across plants for both blue and white collar labor.
If these dierences exist because of market imperfections, then these wages are the marginal
wages and there is no measurement problem. If they reect dierences in labor quality, then
labor quantity is measured with error as it is not properly adjusted for unobserved labor quality.
The potential bias in the measured gap may not be high, as measurement error on the wage
side is oset by a higher measured marginal product per unit labor, as the rms with higher
quality workers have higher estimated productivity levels. For example, consider rm A that
employs half the workers as rm B, but of twice the quality level as rm B, and pays them twice
the wage. Ideally, we may wish to use a quality adjusted measure for labor and wages for all
rms. In the absence of this data, the measured wage for A will of course be higher than for
B. But note that the measured productivity level will be higher for A, which will increase the
marginal product for A. Also, as noted above the fact that marginal revenue is declining in inputs
means that the lower labor level at A will lead to a higher estimated marginal revenue product
for A. Thus A has both a higher measured marginal revenue product, and higher measured
wages, so the biases work to counteract each other. If the amount of measurement error in labor
quality does not change in response to increases in ring costs then this error in the marginal
revenue product is unlikely to vary in a way that would lead to nding larger gaps in periods of
higher ring costs.
Appendix C: Wooldridge (2009) Production Function and
Gap Estimation
C.1 Wooldridge-LP production Function Estimation
This appendix section explains the approach used to estimate the production function parameters
used in our baseline analysis, which is based on Wooldridge (2009). As discussed in section 4,
we posit a Cobb-Douglas production function:
qit = sls
it + ulu
it + kkit + mmit + eeit + vvit + "it; (17)
where qit is the log of the real output, mit is log of real value of intermediate materials, ls
it is
the log of the number of skilled (white collar) employees, lu
it is the log of the number of unskilled
(blue collar) employees, kit is the log of the real capital stock employed, eit is log of electricity
purchased (quantity), and vit is log of the services used by rm i in year t. The error, "it, is
assumed equal to:
"it = !it + it;
with !it the transmitted component of the rm specic productivity shock, and it representing
rm specic iid (unexpected) productivity shock or measurement errors.
As in Olley and Pakes (OP) (1996) or Levinsohn and Petrin (LP) (2003), Wooldridge (2009)
expresses the transmitted component !it as a function of the state variables and the a proxy
variable. The proxy variable is investment in OP and intermediate inputs mit in LP; as discussed
in the text, we prefer the LP to OP because of the well-known lumpiness of investment in plant-
level data (as a result of which the investment proxy is in practice is missing for a number of
observations). Thus for some function g(:;:):
!it = g(xit;mit); t = 1;:::;T;
31where xit is the set of observed state variables. Typically, capital is considered as the state
variable. In our context, because the job security laws introduce adjustments costs to labor, we
include both blue and white collar labor in the set of state variables. So we have:
!it = g(kit;lu
it;ls
it;mit); t = 1;:::;T:
Another key idea in OP, LP and also in Ackerberg, Caves, Frazer (2006) is the assumption
that the state variables are uncorrelated with the innovation:
ait = !it   E (!it=!it 1):
Strengthening this with the assumption that lagged state and proxy variables are uncorre-
lated with the innovation yields a sucient condition for recovering the production function
parameters:









where wit denotes the vector of variable inputs (electricity and services). Note that the current,
but not lagged, values of the variable inputs and the proxy are allowed to be correlated with













where uit  ait + "it. The moment conditions for identifying the parameters are:
E (uitjxit;wit 1;mit 1;:::;w1;x1;m1) = 0








using a general second
order polynomial. Also, as instruments (in addition to the exogenous state variables) we use
rst and second lags of electricity and services, and second order lags of blue and white collar
labor.
The estimation is undertaken separately for each 3-digit industry. The coecient estimates
are summarized in Table A.2.30 These coecient estimates appear reasonable, with materials
predictably having the highest coecient in all industries, followed generally by blue collar labor
(or services in some cases), in line with the cost shares for these inputs. Capital estimates, which
can be unreasonably low (or even negative) in some xed eects estimations, are positive and
bounded away from zero, except for 390 (Other manufacturing industries), where the estimate
is close to zero (possibly because dierent types of plants get classied into this residual sector).
The returns to scale is in the range of 0.82 to 1.06, with all but two point estimates being below
CRS. In the frictionless (zero adjustment cost) world, sucient conditions for optimal input
choice would require decreasing returns to scale. Assuming capital is semi-xed, the returns to
scale excluding capital is indeed less than one for all the industries (column 11). Our use of the
exible inputs (electricity and materials) as controls also assumes that second order conditions
hold for these inputs conditional on others; hence it is reassuring that the sum of the coecients
on these exible inputs (and services) is bounded well below one.
Generally under the Wooldridge (2009) approach (as in OP/LP/ACF), there are more in-
struments than endogenous variables, yielding an overidentication test for the joint validity of
the instruments. The results (p-value) of the overidentication test are reported in column 9;
in none of the cases can the joint validity of the instruments be rejected at the 1% level. For
most cases, the validity cannot be rejected at a cuto of 10%; in industry 321 and 390, the joint
validity is questionable at the 5% cuto level, and for industry 356 at the 10% level.
29This corresponds to equation 2.11 in Wooldridge (2009), which is the equation we use in our estimation.
30We exclude 5 small industries (which constituted less than 5.8% of total observations) where we found
unreasonable (negative) coecient estimates for one of the inputs.
32C.2 Estimating Value Marginal Product and Gap
Given the production function specication and observed input levels, the value marginal prod-
uct is straightforward to calculate once one determines what \error" should be conditioned
upon. The key issue is whether the it term is actual (but unpredicted) productivity or simply
measurement error.
From the perspective of the PL aggregate productivity decomposition, if it is actual (but
unexpected) productivity shock, the full error term ("it = !it + it) is relevant, as there is
no distinction in the measure between predictable versus unpredicted productivity shocks. In
particular, a shift in resources from a rm with a negative gap to one with a positive gap would
lead to greater aggregate productivity change, even if the negative and/or positive gaps arose
because of unpredicted productivity shocks.31 On the other hand, if it is mainly measurement
error, then this does not reect actual productivity and we should condition on !it alone.32
As discussed in Section 7, in our baseline estimates, we condition on the full error term, and










where Qit is the real output measured as the rm revenue deated by the industry price deator.












where  Pht is the price deator for the industry h to which rm i belongs. The derivation is very

























where X demotes logged inputs (other than skilled labor).
As discussed in Section 4, the absolute gap can be obtained directly, once we have estimates
for the VMP, following directly from the denitions. In particular, the absolute value of the gap
between the value of the marginal product and marginal input price for input j is given by:
G
j







it denotes the price of input (wage rate in the case of labor; see Section 6 for denitions
of the price variables).
The summary statistics on the input gaps by industry, as well as for the overall sample are
presented in Appendix Table A.3. For almost all industries the gaps are larger for white collar
31Information technology or other innovations that allow rms to more accurately predict productivity shocks
would thus improve allocative eciency, per the PL measure.
32If the goal of the empirical exercise is to see if rms are optimizing (rather than to estimate changes to
aggregate productivity), there is another reason to condition on !it. In many estimation methodologies (e.g
Levinsohn and Petrin 2003, Olley and Pakes 1996), it is assumed that variable inputs (such as labor and materials)
are chosen conditional on observing the transmitted component (!it). Thus, prot-maximizing rms should be
expected to equate the marginal product conditional on !it to input prices. The marginal revenue conditional on




33relative to blue collar labor. The mean gap is are smaller than either blue or white collar labor
labor for electricity, and negligible for materials. We nd signicant variation in input gaps
across industry. For blue collar labor, the two industries with the highest mean estimated gap
are 313 (Beverages) and 355 (Rubber products), and the two with the smallest mean gap are 322
(Apparel) and 324 (Footwear). For white collar gap, the largest mean gaps are for 356 (Plastic
products) and 331(Wood products), and the smallest mean gaps are for 311(Food products) and
322 (Apparel).
Appendix D: Construction of Capital Series
For 1981 and 1982, the Chilean Manufacturing Census (Encuesta Nacional Industrial Anual)
has book value of capital split into four categories { building, land, machinery and vehicles. For
years 1992 to 1996, book value data is available for building, machinery and vehicles. In order
to treat these series consistently, we aggregate land and building under \building" for years 1980
and 1981 as well.






where bvbldg1980 is the book value for building for 1980, defcons1980 is the base 1979 construction
deator so as to express values in (thousands of) 1979 pesos. Then for the years after 1980, the
real building stock is constructed as:
rbldg1980
t = rbldg1980








where the depreciation rate for building bldg is assumed to equal 5% (following Liu 1991), and
I
bldg
t is the investment in building reported in year t. Following the same logic, for years prior















The exact same procedure is followed to construct the real stock series for vehicles and
machinery as well; the depreciation rate used for these series are 20% and 10% respectively, as
in Liu (1991). The total real depreciated capital stock with base year 1980 is then the sum of
the real depreciated stock of building, machinery and vehicles.
Next, following the same approach, we build separate series for building, machinery and
vehicle stock using the 1981 and each of the 1992-1996 base years. Then, as discussed in Section
6.2, we construct a nal data series using rst the series with base 1980, and where plants have
missing values (because the plant entered after 1980 or was missing in 1980), we replace missing
values using the series for 1981, 1992, 1993, 1994, 1995 and 1996 in that order.33
33The computer code used to construct the capital series is available at:
http://webuser.bus.umich.edu/jagadees/other/chile code.htm
34Figure 1 
Allocative Efficiency Gain from Eliminating a Positive Gap  
 
 
Suppose firm i starts from an environment with a positive gap (induced by say firing costs, or a tax on wages, or markup), so labor is 
L’.  Moving to an environment with zero gap (i.e. labor level L*) yields increase in allocative efficiency equal to the area below the 
VMPL curve and above the wage line. In the case of a gap induced only by markup, the allocative efficiency area corresponds to the 
standard Harberger deadweight triangle.  Figure 2 
Expected Discounted Cost of Firing a Worker 




Source: Heckman and Pages (2004). Firing costs are defined as the additional payment made to the worker at the time of 
dismissal. This definition does not include ``indirect'' payments, like those made by U.S. firms into an insurance fund 



























































































































































































































































































































The Change in Firing Costs in Chile 















1982 1983 1984 1985 1986 1987 1988 1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994Table 1 
The Absolute Value of the Gap 
Between the Value of Marginal Product and the Input Price, 1982-1994 
Simultaneity-Corrected Production Function Estimates, All Specifications include Firm Fixed Effects 
   Blue Collar  White Collar  Materials  Electricity 
   (1)  (2)  (3)  (4)  (5)  (6)  (7)  (8) 
          
 Base Period Gap (1982-1984)    83.42***  83.77***  138.6***  138.9***  0.357***  0.356***  21.11***  21.22*** 
   [6.620]  [6.622]  [5.488]  [5.435]  [0.00985]  [0.00995]  [0.886]  [0.887] 
 Increase in Gap, 2nd Pd. (85-90)    23.47***  22.99**  17.98**  17.56**  -0.0403***  -0.0392***  -0.563  -0.718 
   [8.713]  [8.682]  [7.387]  [7.257]  [0.0143]  [0.0144]  [0.997]  [0.996] 
 Increase in Gap, 3rd Pd. (91-94)    25.58***  25.14***  23.87***  23.48***  -0.0324***  -0.0314**  -2.211  -2.356* 
   [9.038]  [9.066]  [7.922]  [7.916]  [0.0118]  [0.0121]  [1.339]  [1.345] 
 Industry Output Growth Rate      2.201    1.93    -0.00488    0.713 
    [1.904]    [2.076]    [0.0145]    [0.540] 
Observations 43,675  43,675  43,675  43,675  43,675  43,675  43,675  43,675 
R-squared 0.791  0.791  0.653  0.653  0.504  0.504  0.589  0.589 
All gaps are in thousands of 1979 pesos (deflator used is the CPI).  Marginal product estimates are from a gross output (revenue deflated by 
industry-specific deflators) Cobb-Douglas production function specification, which is estimated using Wooldridge (2009) modification of the 
Levinsohn-Petrin (2003) approach to address the simultaneous determination of inputs and productivity. The blue-collar input price is the total 
blue-collar wage bill divided by the number of blue-collar employees. We define the white collar input price similarly. For materials we use a 3-
digit industry-specific price index.  Electricity prices are derived from establishment-specific quantity and value information.  We estimate 
production functions separately for each 3-digit industry. Standard errors (reported in brackets) are clustered at the 4-digit industry level.  
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%.    Figure 4 
Average Absolute Gap: Blue and White Collar Labor 
95% Confidence Interval for Change in Gap 
 
All gaps are in thousands of 1979 pesos (deflator used is the CPI).  Gaps are those implied by the Wooldridge (2009) modification of the Levinsohn-
Petrin (2003) estimator. The figure plots the coefficients from the regression of the absolute value of the gaps on yearly indicator variables, plant-
level fixed effects, and the industry output growth rate. The two lines demark the level of the average gap for blue and white collar labor in 1984, so 
the years for which the line is not within the confidence interval are the years for which the change in the gap is significantly different from the 






















































1982 1984 1986 1988 1990 1992 1994
Year
Blue Collar Gap (Mean)
95% C.I., u.b.
95% C.I., l.b.
White Collar Gap (Mean)
95% C.I., u.b.
95% C.I., l.b.Table 2 
The Gap between the Marginal Revenue Product and the Input Price, 1982-1994 
Simultaneity-Corrected Revenue Function Estimates, All Specifications include Firm Fixed Effects 
   Materials Electricity 
    (1) (2) (3) (4) 
      
 Base Period Gap (1982-1984)    0.348***  0.343***  21.71***  22.05*** 
   [0.00711]  [0.00720]  [0.970]  [0.988] 
 Increase in Gap, 2nd Pd. (85-90)  -0.0145  -0.00728  1.349  0.864 
   [0.00896]  [0.00792]  [0.996]  [1.002] 
 Increase in Gap, 3rd Pd. (91-94)   -0.0107  -0.00384  -2.181  -2.644 
   [0.0142]  [0.0149]  [1.548]  [1.584] 
 Industry Output Growth Rate      -0.0370**    2.485* 
    [0.0169]    [1.396] 
Observations 43,302  43,302  43,302  43,302 
R-squared 0.503  0.503  0.588  0.588 
Marginal revenue product estimates are from a Cobb-Douglas revenue (deflated by CPI) function specification, which is estimated using 
Wooldridge (2009) modification of the Levinsohn-Petrin (2003) approach to address the simultaneous determination of inputs and 
productivity/demand. All gaps are in thousands of 1979 pesos (deflator used is the CPI).  In all cases, we estimate revenue functions separately for 
each 3-digit industry. See notes to Table 1 for definitions of input prices. Standard errors (reported in brackets) are clustered at the 4-digit industry 
level. * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%. 
 
 
   Figure 5 
Trends in the Average Absolute Gap (Normalized) 
Blue and White Collar Labor, Materials, and Electricity 
 
The graph plots the coefficient on year dummies in regression of absolute gap between marginal product of an input and its normalized price. 
Gaps are those implied by the Wooldridge (2009) modification of the Levinsohn-Petrin (2003) estimator. The regressions include firm fixed effects 




















The Gap between the Value of Marginal Product and the Input Price, 1982-1994 
Robustness to Alternative Production Function Specifications 
Simultaneity-Corrected Production Function Estimates, All Specifications include Plant Fixed Effects 
   Cobb-Douglas OLS Fixed Effects  Translog (Order 2) Fixed Effects 
  Blue Collar White Collar  Materials  Electricity Blue  Collar White Collar  Materials  Electricity 
   (1)  (2)  (3)  (4) (5)  (6)  (7)  (8) 
                 
 Base Period Gap (1982-1984)    111.2***  162.9***  0.330***  14.11***  89.31***  146.2***  0.266***  15.76*** 
   [8.618]  [5.579]  [0.0082]  [0.480]  [4.367]  [5.695]  [0.006]  [0.537] 
 Increase in Gap, 2nd Pd. (85-90)    36.88***  32.62***  -0.0234  -0.579  22.88***  25.17***  -0.023***  1.018 
   [10.56]  [6.667]  [0.0147]  [0.587]  [5.687]  [6.496]  [0.007]  [0.638] 
 Increase in Gap, 3rd Pd. (91-94)    33.60***  26.32***  -0.0215**  -1.778**  18.86***  32.75***  -0.0180**  1.02 
   [12.45]  [8.873]  [0.010]  [0.686]  [5.811]  [8.511]  [0.008]  [0.820] 
 Industry Output Growth Rate    9.43  11.67  -0.0312  1.404  2.843*  5.667**  0.000  0.191 
 [5.690]  [7.810]  [0.0200]  [0.914]  [1.476]  [2.369]  [0.009]  [0.554] 
Observations 41,067  41,067  41,067  41,067       46,353       46,353       46,353       46,353 
R-squared 0.801  0.655  0.502  0.599  0.721  0.646  0.525  0.575 
All gaps are in thousands of 1979 pesos (deflator used is the CPI).  In columns 1 to 4, the marginal product estimates are from a gross output Cobb-
Douglas production function specification, which is estimated using OLS with plant-period fixed effects. In columns 5 to 8, the marginal product 
estimates are from a gross output Translog (order 2) production function specification, which is estimated using OLS with plant-period fixed 
effects. In all cases, we estimate production functions separately for each 3-digit industry. See notes to Table 1 for definitions of input prices. 
Standard errors (reported in brackets) are clustered at the 4-digit industry level. * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%. 
 
   Table 4 
The Gap between the Value of Marginal Product and the Wages, 1982-1994 
Robustness to using Transmitted Component of the Error Term 
Simultaneity-Corrected Production Function Estimates, All Specifications include Plant Fixed Effects 
   Using Transmitted Component of Error 
  Blue Collar  White Collar Materials  Electricity 
   (1)  (2)  (3)  (4) 
        
 Base Period Gap (1982-1984)    83.89***  138.8***  0.276***  21.14*** 
   [5.596]  [5.092]  [0.00988]  [0.819] 
 Increase in Gap, 2nd Pd. (85-90)    20.74***  16.46**  -0.0240**  -0.383 
   [7.327]  [6.851]  [0.0116]  [0.863] 
 Increase in Gap, 3rd Pd. (91-94)    19.78**  18.21**  -0.0395***  -3.284** 
   [7.779]  [7.544]  [0.0141]  [1.324] 
 Industry Output Growth Rate    2.053  1.748  -0.0165**  0.566 
 [1.659]  [2.107]  [0.00628]  [0.522] 
Observations 43,675  43,675  43,675  43,675 
R-squared 0.803  0.654  0.602  0.603 
All gaps are in thousands of 1979 pesos (deflator used is the CPI).  Marginal product estimates are from a gross output Cobb-Douglas production 
function specification, which is estimated using Wooldridge (2009) modification of the Levinsohn-Petrin (2003) approach to address the 
simultaneous determination of inputs and productivity. To calculate the marginal product, the transmitted component of the error term is used. 
See notes to Table 1 for definitions of input prices. Standard errors (reported in brackets) are clustered at the 4-digit industry level. * significant at 
10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%.  
  Table 5 
The Gap between the Value of Marginal Product and the Input Price, 1982-1994 
Robustness to using alternative wage measure and using positive gaps only 
Simultaneity-Corrected Production Function Estimates, All Specifications include Plant Fixed Effects 
   Alternative wage measure  Positive gaps only 
  Blue Collar  White Collar  Blue Collar  White Collar 
   (1)  (2)  (3)  (4) (5)  (6)  (7)  (8) 
                 
 Base Period Gap (1982-1984)    100.8***  100.2***  196.0***  199.6***  109.1***  111.1***  145.3***  145.8*** 
   [4.577]  [3.928]  [9.992]  [11.91]  [6.682]  [6.721]  [10.23]  [10.23] 
 Increase in Gap, 2nd Pd. (85-90)    16.23**  17.02***  7.737  2.500  44.79***  41.46***  44.90***  44.09*** 
   [6.556]  [5.599]  [15.73]  [18.76]  [6.962]  [6.856]  [12.46]  [12.41] 
 Increase in Gap, 3rd Pd. (91-94)    37.46***  38.17***  55.37***  50.62***  44.24***  41.44***  41.44***  40.72*** 
   [7.167]  [6.664]  [11.33]  [13.14]  [11.50]  [11.71]  [14.29]  [14.36] 
 Industry Output Growth Rate      -4.04    24.75    19.52***    4.493 
    [11.68]    [22.85]    [7.137]    [3.625] 
Observations 43,346  43,346  43,502  43,502  26,949  26,949  27,208  27,208 
R-squared 0.736  0.736  0.525  0.525  0.803  0.804  0.684  0.684 
All gaps are in thousands of 1979 pesos (deflator used is the CPI).  In columns 1-4, we use as an alternative industry-level wage measure based on 
the changes in employment and wage bill at firms increasing employment by at least 10% .  In columns 5-8, we use only those observations that 
have positive gaps – for these cases, measurement error in wages biases the gap downwards.  Marginal product estimates are from a gross output 
(revenue deflated by industry-specific deflators) Cobb-Douglas production function specification, which is estimated using Wooldridge (2009) 
modification of the Levinsohn-Petrin (2003) approach to address the simultaneous determination of inputs and productivity. The blue-collar input 
price is the total blue-collar wage bill divided by the number of blue-collar employees. We define the white collar input price similarly. For 
materials we use a 3-digit industry-specific price index.  Electricity prices are derived from establishment-specific quantity and value information.  
We estimate production functions separately for each 3-digit industry. Standard errors (reported in brackets) are clustered at the 4-digit industry 
level. * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%. 
  Table 6 
The Gap between the Value of Marginal Product and the Wages, 1982-1994 
Sample-splitting Test based on Excess Worker Turnover 
Simultaneity-Corrected Production Function Estimates, All Specifications include Plant Fixed Effects 

















(1a) (1b) (2a) (2b) (3a) (3b) (4a) (4b) 
 Base Period Gap (1982-1984)    69.48***  114.0***  116.7***  185.2***  0.325***  0.415***  20.79***  22.61*** 
   [8.157]  [6.995]  [6.453]  [9.019]  [0.0130]  [0.0136]  [0.819]  [1.223] 
 Increase in Gap, 2nd Pd. (85-90)    18.28  29.71***  14.16*  21.34  -0.0388**  -0.0341  -1.783*  0.731 
   [10.73]  [8.193]  [7.305]  [14.86]  [0.0188]  [0.0201]  [0.946]  [1.272] 
 Increase in Gap, 3rd Pd. (91-94)    19.54*  34.78***  20.60*  27.40***  -0.0328*  -0.0257  -3.912***  0.00538 
   [11.04]  [11.65]  [10.38]  [9.476]  [0.0163]  [0.0167]  [1.261]  [1.966] 
 Industry Output Growth Rate    0.311  18.44**  0.0446  17.95*  -0.00141  -0.0348  0.406  3.219*** 
[0.561]  [6.835]  [0.869]  [9.985]  [0.0135]  [0.0213]  [0.356]  [0.951] 
Observations        29,151        14,524        29,151        14,524        29,151        14,524        29,151        14,524 
R-squared 0.807  0.773  0.645  0.648  0.514  0.484  0.549  0.651 
Excess worker turnover is defined as total worker turnover less job turnover normalized by employment, and is defined using 3-digit SIC code 
Quarterly Workforce Indicators (QWI) data for the United States. All gaps are in thousands of 1979 pesos (deflator used is the CPI).  Marginal 
product estimates are from a gross output Cobb-Douglas production function specification, which is estimated using Wooldridge (2009) 
modification of the Levinsohn-Petrin (2003) approach to address the simultaneous determination of inputs and productivity. See notes to Table 1 
for definitions of input prices. Standard errors (reported in brackets) are clustered at the 4-digit industry level. * significant at 10%; ** significant at 























Source: Authors’ calculations 
 
Figure A.2 
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Figure A.3 


























































































  APPENDIX 
 
Table A.1 
Explaining Movements in Real Wages 
   (1)  (2)  (3)  (4)   (5)
       
Period Dummy (1985-1990)  -0.37 -0.37 -0.40 -0.36 -0.53 
  [0.02]** [0.02]** [0.02]** [0.02]** [0.02]** 
Period  Dummy  (1991-1996)  0.081 0.072  -0.007 0.092  -0.112 
  [0.02]** [0.02]**  [0.02] [0.02]** [0.02]** 
Firm Output Growth Rate    0.008       
    [0.002]**    
Log(Industry  Output)     0.127   
     [0.021]**   
Industry Output Growth Rate        0.001   
      [0.006]  
Unemployment  Rate       -2.131 
       [ 0 . 1 9 ] * *  
Constant  4.49 4.52 2.52 4.48 4.81 
  [0.014]** [0.014]** [0.319]** [0.016]** [0.026]** 
Observations 86,176  73,701 86,160 80,346 86,176 
R-squared  0.80 0.82 0.81 0.81 0.81 
Dependent variable is Log (real wage rate).  Real wage rate is the nominal wage rate deflated by the 
producer price index.  Nominal wage rate is defined as the total wage bill/ number of employees.  For 
each independent variable the first row gives the coefficient values and the second row gives the related 
t-values.  All regressions include firm fixed effects.  Standard errors are adjusted for clustering at the 4-




Baseline Production Function Coefficient Estimates (Wooldridge 2009) 
 







Returns to scale 
(excluding 
capital) 
(1)                (2)               (3)               (4)               (5)                (6)               (7)  (8) (9)  (10)  (11) 
311 0.089 0.025 0.023 0.694  0.055 0.064      14,934   0.159  0.9492  0.9237 
313 0.153 0.033 0.058 0.450  0.114 0.125         1,228   0.142  0.9330  0.9004 
321 0.105 0.048 0.031 0.614  0.027 0.116         4,460   0.027  0.9412  0.8931 
322 0.105 0.060 0.070 0.615  0.034 0.084         3,598   0.567  0.9679  0.9076 
323 0.115 0.074 0.092 0.741  0.011 0.027            648   0.519  1.0610  0.9874 
324 0.150 0.060 0.022 0.575  0.042 0.083         1,684   0.583  0.9320  0.8721 
331 0.219 0.073 0.035 0.528  0.023 0.099         3,609   0.666  0.9765  0.9038 
342 0.056 0.074 0.067 0.418  0.066 0.141         2,084   0.584  0.8214  0.7477 
352 0.014 0.047 0.045 0.638  0.027 0.189         2,141   0.516  0.9601  0.9133 
355 0.296 0.050 0.065 0.403  0.010 0.099            718   0.128  0.9227  0.8731 
356 0.241 0.100 0.084 0.420  0.031 0.120         2,308   0.094  0.9953  0.8952 
362 0.155 0.098 0.079 0.466  0.096 0.077            256   0.483  0.9711  0.8732 
381 0.131 0.100 0.071 0.546  0.051 0.126         4,291   0.642  1.0244  0.9244 
383 0.149 0.014 0.022 0.580  0.025 0.168            638   0.353  0.9588  0.9445 
384 0.154 0.090 0.051 0.504  0.052 0.092         1,166   0.747  0.9437  0.8539 
390 0.214 0.007 0.008 0.504  0.020 0.125            664   0.033  0.8783  0.8716 
Production function coefficient estimates are from a gross output (revenue deflated by industry-specific deflators) Cobb-Douglas production 
function specification, which is estimated using Wooldridge (2009) modification of the Levinsohn-Petrin (2003) approach to address the 
simultaneous determination of inputs and productivity. 
  APPENDIX 
 
Table A.3 
The Absolute Value of the Gap 
Between the Value of Marginal Product and the Input Price, 1982-1994 
Summary Statistics by Industry 
      Blue Collar  White Collar  Materials  Electricity    
Industry Description  Mean  SD  Mean  SD  Mean  SD  Mean  SD  N 
311 Food  products  87.46  189.40  103.71  154.06  0.22  0.41  23.50  31.53  14859
313 Beverages  289.26  292.47  160.97  183.57  0.39  0.46  59.56  51.87  1117
321 Textiles  61.55  103.98  125.95  154.54  0.39  0.52  10.86  21.68  4241
322  Apparel (excl footwear)  42.21  87.86  120.58  152.01  0.34  0.54  21.00  24.18  3532
323 Leather  products  93.40  129.51  222.92  252.75  0.25  0.37  5.10  14.58  623
324 Footwear  53.53  98.53  130.19  140.45  0.21  0.23  27.01  32.04  1648
331  Wood products   145.89  207.98  236.95  278.53  0.41  0.60  5.92  15.93  3622
342 Printing  and  publishing  87.46  139.07  130.42  175.77  0.37  0.43  29.83  33.02  2073
352 Other  chemicals  67.07  63.33  226.26  200.02  0.39  0.50  28.81  33.85  2006
355 Rubber  products  260.83  280.14  111.99  145.95  0.38  0.37  2.28  8.54  678
356 Plastic  products  234.90  256.37  267.45  287.03  0.34  0.28  7.68  21.20  2293
362 Glass  products  154.80  245.82  226.91  274.01  0.82  0.92  31.06  47.07  215
381  Fabricated metal products  87.24  162.25  219.51  273.50  0.36  0.49  20.11  28.90  4308
383 Electrical  machinery  178.82  264.15  196.88  165.42  0.46  0.59  13.14  21.92  650
384 Transport  equipment  121.26  232.84  213.26  285.85  0.52  0.60  22.13  33.40  1184
390  Other manufactured products  109.57  132.79  121.44  110.27  0.74  0.85  9.09  16.46  626
Overall     102.50  186.70  154.71  207.24  0.33  0.49  20.09  30.40  43675 
All gaps are in thousands of 1979 pesos (deflator used is the CPI).  Marginal product estimates are from a gross output (revenue deflated by 
industry-specific deflators) Cobb-Douglas production function specification, which is estimated using Wooldridge (2009) modification of the 
Levinsohn-Petrin (2003) approach to address the simultaneous determination of inputs and productivity. The blue-collar input price is the total 
blue-collar wage bill divided by the number of blue-collar employees. We define the white collar input price similarly. For materials we use a 3-
digit industry-specific price index.  Electricity prices are derived from establishment-specific quantity and value information.  We estimate 
production functions separately for each 3-digit industry. 
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Table A.4 
The Gap between the Value of Marginal Product and the Wages, 1982-1994 
Sample-splitting Test based on Industry Unionization Rate 
Simultaneity-Corrected Production Function Estimates, All Specifications include Plant Fixed Effects 

















(1a) (1b) (2a) (2b) (3a) (3b) (4a) (4b) 
 Base Period Gap (1982-1984)    91.18***  71.89***  136.5***  140.1***  0.289***  0.421***  25.87***  18.13*** 
   [7.686]  [7.777]  [4.652]  [8.580]  [0.0138]  [0.0141]  [0.771]  [0.933] 
 Increase in Gap, 2nd Pd. (85-90)    12.59  26.63***  2.943  30.47***  -0.021  -0.0547***  -3.040***  0.68 
   [12.00]  [7.732]  [7.590]  [10.60]  [0.0177]  [0.0179]  [1.027]  [0.982] 
 Increase in Gap, 3rd Pd. (91-94)    8.876  38.22***  3.893  44.05***  -0.0345*  -0.0265  -6.187***  0.406 
   [7.902]  [13.31]  [5.319]  [12.59]  [0.0182]  [0.0186]  [1.125]  [1.417] 
 Industry Output Growth Rate    20.38**  0.342  29.12***  -0.664  -0.0161  -0.00358  5.342***  0.448 
[8.060]  [0.854]  [9.190]  [1.258]  [0.0103]  [0.0194]  [1.634]  [0.477] 
Observations        21,990        19,519        21,990        19,519        21,990        19,519        21,990        19,519 
R-squared 0.827  0.747  0.669  0.65  0.516  0.492  0.554  0.631 
Unionization rate is defined at the 3-digit industry level using data on employment history and union status in the Social Protection Survey 
dataset for 2009 (accessed at http://www.proteccionsocial.cl/). All gaps are in thousands of 1979 pesos (deflator used is the CPI).  Marginal 
product estimates are from a gross output Cobb-Douglas production function specification, which is estimated using Wooldridge (2009) 
modification of the Levinsohn-Petrin (2003) approach to address the simultaneous determination of inputs and productivity. See notes to Table 1 
for definitions of input prices. Standard errors (reported in brackets) are clustered at the 4-digit industry level. * significant at 10%; ** significant at 
5%; *** significant at 1%.  
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Table A.5 
The Absolute Value of the Gap 
Between the Value of Marginal Product and the Input Price, 1982-1994 
Robustness to alternative (GDP) deflator 
Simultaneity-Corrected Production Function Estimates, All Specifications include Firm Fixed Effects 
   Blue Collar  White Collar  Materials  Electricity 
    (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
          
 Base Period Gap (1982-1984)    93.86***  94.28***  155.7***  156.1***  0.400***  0.400***  23.68***  23.81*** 
   [6.810]  [6.816]  [5.709]  [5.659]  [0.0117]  [0.0118]  [1.000]  [1.004] 
 Increase in Gap, 2nd Pd. (85-90)    22.09**  21.51**  14.28*  13.74*  -0.0561***  -0.0549***  -1.326  -1.51 
   [8.804]  [8.765]  [7.650]  [7.507]  [0.0171]  [0.0172]  [1.118]  [1.121] 
 Increase in Gap, 3rd Pd. (91-94)    25.11**  24.57**  21.69**  21.20**  -0.0456***  -0.0446***  -3.047**  -3.217** 
   [9.524]  [9.566]  [8.392]  [8.403]  [0.0136]  [0.0139]  [1.515]  [1.524] 
 Industry Output Growth Rate      2.684    2.444    -0.0053    0.843 
    [2.274]    [2.467]    [0.0153]    [0.642] 
Observations 43,675  43,675  43,675  43,675  43,675  43,675  43,675  43,675 
R-squared 0.792  0.792  0.653  0.653  0.504  0.504  0.589  0.589 
The deflator used is the GDP deflator (World Bank WDI).  Marginal product estimates are from a gross output (revenue deflated by industry-
specific deflators) Cobb-Douglas production function specification, which is estimated using Wooldridge (2009) modification of the Levinsohn-
Petrin (2003) approach to address the simultaneous determination of inputs and productivity. The blue-collar input price is the total blue-collar 
wage bill divided by the number of blue-collar employees. We define the white collar input price similarly. For materials we use a 3-digit 
industry-specific price index.  Electricity prices are derived from establishment-specific quantity and value information.  We estimate production 
functions separately for each 3-digit industry. Standard errors (reported in brackets) are clustered at the 4-digit industry level. * significant at 10%; 
** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%. 
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Table A.6 
The Gap between the Value of Marginal Product and the Input Price, 1982-1994 
Robustness to using Balanced Panels 
Simultaneity-Corrected Production Function Estimates, All Specifications include Plant Fixed Effects 
   Balanced Panel 1  Balanced Panel 2 
  Blue Collar White Collar  Materials  Electricity Blue  Collar White Collar  Materials  Electricity 
   (1)  (2)  (3)  (4) (5)  (6)  (7)  (8) 
                 
 Base Period Gap (1982-1984)    92.71***  135.7***  0.342***  20.15***  88.44***  133.3***  0.335***  20.72*** 
   [7.377]  [5.764]  [0.0102]  [0.908]  [6.923]  [5.667]  [0.00954]  [0.958] 
 Increase in Gap, 2nd Pd. (85-90)    27.14***  18.72**  -0.0457***  -0.852  24.82**  19.02**  -0.0373**  -0.689 
   [9.805]  [7.928]  [0.0145]  [1.041]  [9.365]  [7.867]  [0.0141]  [1.114] 
 Increase in Gap, 3rd Pd. (91-94)    30.33***  27.13***  -0.0345***  -1.261  27.58***  25.70***  -0.0257**  -1.48 
   [10.15]  [8.450]  [0.0128]  [1.432]  [9.406]  [8.259]  [0.0114]  [1.485] 
 Industry Output Growth Rate    2.471  2.099  -0.0104  0.593  2.832  2.541  -0.0125  0.65 
  [1.985]  [2.063]  [0.00823]  [0.431]  [2.190]  [2.378]  [0.00951]  [0.461] 
Observations 22,923  22,923  22,923  22,923  26,928  26,928  26,928  26,928 
R-squared 0.788  0.606  0.427  0.548  0.783  0.603  0.425  0.537 
All gaps are in thousands of 1979 pesos (deflator used is the CPI).  In columns 1-4 (Balanced Panel 1), we use only those plants that have at least 
two observations in the base period (1982-1984), all six  observations for the 2nd period (85-90) and at least two observations for the third period 
(91-94).  In columns 5-8 (Balanced Panel 2), we use only those plants that have at least two observations in each of the three periods.  Marginal 
product estimates are from a gross output (revenue deflated by industry-specific deflators) Cobb-Douglas production function specification, 
which is estimated using Wooldridge (2009) modification of the Levinsohn-Petrin (2003) approach to address the simultaneous determination of 
inputs and productivity. The blue-collar input price is the total blue-collar wage bill divided by the number of blue-collar employees. We define 
the white collar input price similarly. For materials we use a 3-digit industry-specific price index.  Electricity prices are derived from 
establishment-specific quantity and value information.  We estimate production functions separately for each 3-digit industry. Standard errors 
(reported in brackets) are clustered at the 4-digit industry level. * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%.   APPENDIX 
 
Table A.7 
Effect of gap on exit hazard/propensity  
 
    (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
  splui  streg streg  ols  ols  streg streg  ols  ols 
Absolute blue collar gap   0.000952***  3.79e-05*** 
[0.000188] [1.36e-05] 
Absolute blue collar gap X D_(Blue gap >0)  0.000881***  3.66e-05*** 
[0.000192] [1.35e-05] 
Absolute blue collar gap X D_(Blue gap <=0)  0.00403***  0.000159*** 
[0.000872] [5.81e-05] 
Absolute white collar gap   0.000215  1.80e-05*** 
[0.000185] [4.53e-06] 
Absolute white collar gap X D_(White gap >0)  0.000153  1.69e-05*** 
[0.000196] [3.99e-06] 
Absolute white collar gap X D_(White gap <=0)  0.000741* 3.19e-05* 
[0.000394] [1.60e-05] 
Size, age controls  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes 
Industry, year effects  Yes  Yes  No  No  Yes  Yes  No  No 
Industry-year effects  No  No  Yes  Yes  No  No  Yes  Yes 
Observations 43,680  43,680  43,680  43,680  43,680  43,680  43,680  43,680 

















Absolute blue collar gap (SD: 218.65)  1.1945  0.0071 
Absolute positive blue collar gap (SD: 220.97)  1.1830  0.0070 
Absolute negative blue collar gap (SD: 18.49)  1.1169  0.0044 
Absolute white collar gap (SD: 187.98)  1.0456  0.0037 
Absolute positive white collar gap (SD: 183.66)  1.0324  0.0035 
Absolute negative white collar gap (SD: 96.07)                 1.0726    0.0030 
Columns 1,2 5 and 6 are ML regression survival-time (exponential) models.  Columns 2, 3, 7 and 8 are linear exit models (with the dependent 
variable an exit dummy =1 if the plant exits from the sample in that year).   The gaps are estimated as in Table 1 (see notes).  Standard errors 
(reported in brackets) are clustered at the 4-digit industry level. * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%. 